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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines how entrepreneurs’ human and social capital influence their knowledge of 
finance alternatives. For this purpose, we use survey data from 125 Belgian start-ups. Results 
demonstrate that entrepreneurs with an education in the field of business and entrepreneurs with 
experience in accounting or finance have a broader knowledge of finance alternatives. This is 
especially the case for the less commonly used finance alternatives. Having indirect ties to people 
with knowledge of finance also enhances the total knowledge of finance alternatives. However, 
more generic human capital, such as prior entrepreneurial experience and direct ties have no 
impact on entrepreneurs’ knowledge of finance alternatives. Overall, this study demonstrates how 
not only supply side factors, but also demand side factors are constraining entrepreneurs in their 
search for finance.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Finance is one of the necessary resources required for entrepreneurial ventures to form and 
subsequently develop (Gilbert et al., 2006). Finance decisions are hence key decisions made by 
entrepreneurs, which bear significant implications for the operations, risk of failure, performance 
and future growth potential of ventures (Michaelas et al., 1999; Cassar, 2004). Traditional finance 
theory resorts to the framework of perfect capital markets (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). This 
framework assumes that information is free and directly available to all entrepreneurs, which 
allows entrepreneurs to make comprehensive finance decisions with wealth maximization as their 
ultimate goal (Brealey and Myers, 2000). Moreover, in this perspective, the supply and demand 
for finance are in equilibrium, which implies that all value-creating projects will find sufficient 
finance. Contrary to this image portrayed in traditional finance theory, entrepreneurial ventures are 
often confronted with finance constraints and are not able to raise sufficient outside finance 
necessary to conduct all their value-creating investment projects (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; 
Hubbard, 1998). As a result, the growth of entrepreneurial ventures is often restricted by internal 
finance (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
 
Scholars studying finance constraints within entrepreneurial ventures have largely stressed 
supply-side arguments, thereby putting the decision-making process of investors in the foreground. 
Within this perspective, it is generally assumed that investors will be wary to finance ventures that 
face high levels of information asymmetries, as information asymmetries are precursors of agency 
problems. Hence, young ventures, which are thought to face high information asymmetries, due to 
their lack of a track record, are especially prone to finance constraints (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
The same argument applies to technology-based ventures, which need to conduct significant 
investments in intangible research and development projects that carry high levels of information 
asymmetries (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994).  
 
  
Next to information asymmetries and associated agency problems, scholars have focused on the 
role of transaction costs in explaining why investors may refrain from investing in entrepreneurial 
ventures (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cassar, 2004). A significant fraction of transaction costs are 
fixed, which creates economies of scale in issue size (Wald, 1999). This further limits the finance 
options that are available to small ventures. The scale required to issue equity or bonds on public 
capital markets, for example, excludes smaller ventures from this type of finance (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). Transaction costs also partially explain why venture capital investors are more 
reluctant to invest in start-ups, as typically smaller amounts are invested at start-up. The high 
search and selection costs faced by venture capital investors make small investments 
uneconomical (Lockett et al., 2002).  
 
Research on demand-side arguments, which puts the decision-making process of entrepreneurs 
in the foreground, is more limited, but growing rapidly. Entrepreneurs are the driving force of 
important decisions and entrepreneurial characteristics may hence play an important role in 
explaining finance decisions (Cassar, 2004). Prior research demonstrates how many entrepreneurs 
have other goals besides value maximization. Entrepreneurs are often unwilling, for example, to 
raise outside equity because of fear of losing independence and control over their ventures 
(Manigart and Struyf, 1997; Sapienza et al., 2003). Moreover, the limited risk tolerance of 
entrepreneurs may preclude them from raising outside debt finance.  
 
This article focuses on another entrepreneurial characteristic that may restrain the finance 
alternatives considered by entrepreneurs, namely their knowledge of these finance alternatives. 
Traditional finance theories implicitly assume that all entrepreneurs are fully aware of the 
existence of all potential finance alternatives and their respective advantages and disadvantages. 
However, recent studies indicate that entrepreneurs may also face finance constraints due to the 
existence of a knowledge gap. Van Auken (2001) showed that entrepreneurs of small technology-
based ventures are likely to consider only a limited set of finance alternatives, due to their limited 
understanding of particular finance alternatives. The goal of this study is to expand this stream of 
research by explaining why some entrepreneurs have a higher knowledge of finance alternatives 
than others. More specifically, the impact of entrepreneurs’ human and social capital on their 
knowledge of finance alternatives is explored. We propose and show that higher levels of specific 
human and social capital, i.e. more experience in finance or accounting, business education and 
knowledgeable social networks, lead to a deeper knowledge of finance alternatives. This might at 
least partly explain why entrepreneurs with high levels of human capital have less binding capital 
constraints when starting new businesses (Astebro and Bernhardt, 2005).  
 
In the following section, we develop the theoretical arguments and hypotheses on the impact of 
human and social capital on an entrepreneur’s knowledge of finance alternatives. Next, we discuss 
the empirical strategy used to test the hypotheses and describe in detail the data and variables 
employed in this study. Thereafter, we present our research findings, followed by concluding 
remarks and avenues for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
While entrepreneurs are key decision makers shaping the entrepreneurial strategy within their 
ventures, the literature exploring the relationship between entrepreneurial characteristics and 
finance strategies in entrepreneurial ventures is only emerging. In this paper, we explore the role 
of entrepreneurs’ human and social capital on their knowledge of finance alternatives. 
 
  
Prior research demonstrates how human capital influences the ease by which entrepreneurs are 
able to overcome finance constraints through two distinct processes. First, human capital is 
positively related with the wealth of entrepreneurs. Hence, entrepreneurs with more human capital 
can use more of their personal funds to mitigate the finance constraints experienced by their 
ventures (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996). Second, the human capital of 
entrepreneurs serves as a quality signal. Investors are more likely to contribute finance to start-ups 
that have information signals indicating high-quality resources and capabilities (Hallen, 2008). 
Taking both effects together, Astebro and Bernhardt (2005) found that ventures established by 
entrepreneurs with higher human capital generally have less binding capital constraints. 
 
We argue that the human capital of entrepreneurs may not only be associated with their personal 
wealth and quality signals, but also with their knowledge of finance alternatives. Financial theory 
typically assumes that entrepreneurs are fully aware of all finance alternatives and their 
characteristics. An alternative information asymmetry problem, besides the one experienced by 
investors, is that not all entrepreneurs have an equally broad understanding of the finance options 
that are available. This indicates the existence of a knowledge gap (Gibson, 1992). Hence, 
entrepreneurs will be unaware of particular finance alternatives, which will limit the set of finance 
options considered by entrepreneurs (Van Auken, 2001). This may lead to suboptimal finance 
decisions and ultimately to finance constraints.  
 
We propose that entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital will experience a lower 
knowledge gap compared to their peers with lower levels of human capital. Human capital is 
typically represented by both education and previous experience (Colombo and Grilli, 2005). 
Entrepreneurs with higher levels of education have a higher probability of having studied business 
finance. Moreover, given their greater learning skills, they may also have a higher ability of 
learning about finance alternatives after their formal education. Hence, we expect a positive 
association between the level of education of entrepreneurs and their knowledge of finance 
alternatives. Furthermore, entrepreneurs with prior experience may also have a greater knowledge 
of finance alternatives. Entrepreneurs with prior start-up experience, for example, may have 
negotiated with different types of financiers to fund these start-ups. This leads to our first 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: Entrepreneurs with higher levels of generic human capital have a greater knowledge of 
finance alternatives. 
 
Researchers have stressed that not all human capital is equally important, however. Specific 
human capital is more valuable than generic human capital (Colombo and Grilli (2005). In the 
context of knowledge of finance alternatives, it is likely that entrepreneurs with a business 
education have higher knowledge compared to entrepreneurs with higher non-business education 
or compared to entrepreneurs with less education. Further, entrepreneurs with previous experience 
in accounting or finance are more likely to have a broader and deeper knowledge of finance 
alternatives. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Entrepreneurs with higher levels of context specific human capital have a greater 
knowledge of finance alternatives. 
 
Next to human capital, entrepreneurs can also learn about finance alternatives through their 
social networks. Direct ties provide an advantage to entrepreneurs who seek to obtain resources 
from investors through access to private information (Podolny, 1994). Prior research argues that 
direct ties between entrepreneurs and investors allow potential investors to improve their selection 
  
(Shane and Cable, 2002). We claim that knowledgeable direct ties, established before start-up, 
may also reduce information problems experienced by entrepreneurs, as they enable information 
transfer to entrepreneurs about potential finance alternatives and investor characteristics. For 
example, entrepreneurs that have close relationships with bankers are able to discuss their specific 
financial needs with these ties, allowing them to gain a deeper understanding of finance 
alternatives. Direct ties are hence not only relevant for suppliers of finance, but they also reduce 
information asymmetries on the demand side of the market. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Entrepreneurs with knowledgeable direct ties have a greater knowledge of finance 
alternatives. 
 
Information is not only transferred through direct ties, but also through indirect ties. Indirect ties 
provide access to more information, at a higher speed and at a lower cost compared to direct ties 
(Burt, 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). This explains why indirect ties reduce information 
asymmetries for potential investors and increase the likelihood that investors will contribute 
finance (Shane and Cable, 2002). We expect the same processes to reduce information 
asymmetries for entrepreneurs as well. Hence, the knowledge gap faced by entrepreneurs who can 
rely on more knowledgeable indirect ties is likely to be lower compared to their peers that lack 
these indirect ties. This leads to the final hypothesis: 
 
H4: Entrepreneurs with knowledgeable indirect ties have a greater knowledge of finance 
alternatives. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Data collection strategy 
 
A random sample of 450 Flemish ventures founded between April 2008 and September 2008 
was selected from the records of business incorporation as provided by the Flemish government. 
Given the homogeneous sample frame, non measured variance in terms of geographical location 
and age is reduced. Moreover, we limit survivorship and recollection biases by sampling ventures 
close to the period of formation (Cassar, 2004). 
 
A questionnaire was developed and pre-tested in the autumn of 2008. Between mid November 
2008 and mid January 2009, we telephoned all ventures in order to identify whether or not they 
fulfilled the conditions of our research. As the focus of the research is on real start-ups, ventures 
that were not independent and previously existing companies that continued under a new form 
were excluded. This resulted in a sample of 288 independent Flemish start-ups, which were mailed 
the questionnaire. Several possibilities to complete and return the questionnaires were offered, 
including e-mail, fax, post, and web-survey. After a first mailing, 68 usable questionnaires were 
received. A second mailing was sent to non-respondents three weeks after the first mailing. After 
further telephone and e-mail follow-ups, a total of 125 usable questionnaires were returned. This 
results in a response rate of 43%. The majority of respondents (84%) completed the questionnaire 
using the web-survey.  
 
The questionnaire was organized in three main sections. The first section collected information 
about the venture (name, current function of the respondent, venture origin, number of founders, 
whether formal financial planning was conducted at start-up or not). The second section asked 
respondents to what degree they are familiar with finance alternatives (e.g. loans, supplier credit, 
leasing, venture capital, factoring and bonds among other finance alternatives). The third section 
  
of the questionnaire asked respondents to list their prior experience, education and ties with 
finance experts.  
 
Variables 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the dependent, independent and control variables used in the 
multivariate analyses.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
Dependent variables. A list of finance alternatives was composed based on the finance sources 
listed by Van Auken (2001), bootstrap finance strategies listed by Winborg and Landström (2001) 
and government programs specific for the Flemish region. The knowledge of the respondent with 
respect to the different finance alternatives was measured on a 6-point Likert scale, with 1=very 
limited knowledge to 5=very extensive knowledge, and 0 indicated the respondent was unaware of 
the existence of a particular finance alternative. The Likert scales were subsequently centered so 
that negative values represent below average knowledge of a finance alternative and positive 
values represent above average knowledge of finance alternatives. 
 
A factor analysis was undertaken in order to identify groups of finance alternatives. Table 2 
shows the results of the factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is 0.876 and Bartlett’s 
Test 0.000, implying that a factor analysis is meaningful. Only factors with an eigenvalue larger 
than 1 are considered for further analysis. This procedure yields four factors, capturing 70 percent 
of the total variance after varimax rotation. The factors are broadly consistent with those identified 
by Van Auken (2001). Factor 1 captures the knowledge of the most commonly used finance 
alternatives, factor 2 captures the knowledge of advanced finance alternatives for the start-up 
phase, factor 3 captures the knowledge of advanced finance alternatives for the growth phase and 
factor 4 captures the knowledge of bootstrap finance methods. These four factors, together with 
the total knowledge of all finance alternatives, are used as dependent variables in the multivariate 
analyses. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 
Independent variables. The key independent variables are correlates of the human and social 
capital of the founding entrepreneur. Following Colombo and Grilli (2005), a distinction is made 
between specific and generic human capital. Following variables proxy for specific human capital: 
business education (dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur has a degree in business and 0 
otherwise) and number of years of work experience of the entrepreneur in accountancy or finance. 
Following variables proxy for generic human capital: higher education (dummy variable equal to 1 
if the entrepreneur has a university-level or equivalent degree and 0 otherwise), number of years of 
work experience of the entrepreneur in the same industry, number of years of work experience of 
the entrepreneur in other industries, management experience (dummy variable equal to 1 if an 
entrepreneur previously held a management position in a company employing more than 100 
people and zero otherwise), self-employment experience (dummy variable equal to 1 if 
entrepreneur has prior self-employment experience and 0 otherwise), start-up experience (dummy 
variable equal to 1 if entrepreneur has prior start-up experience and 0 otherwise).  
 
  
The social capital variables are measured with multi-item five-point Likert scales ranging from 
1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. Each scale is calculated by adding together the values for 
the items that composed the scale and dividing by the number of items. The items are taken from 
Shane and Cable (2002) and adapted to our setting. The direct tie scale is composed of three 
questions about direct ties between the entrepreneur and finance experts. A finance expert is each 
individual with correct and reliable information about finance alternatives. The items are: “Prior to 
the company’s start-up, I had a professional relationship with at least one finance expert”; “Prior 
to the company’s start-up, at least one finance expert was someone with whom I had engaged in 
informal social activity (e.g., playing tennis, going to the movies)”; “Prior to the company’s start-
up, at least one finance expert was a personal friend” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74). The indirect tie 
scale is composed of three questions on indirect ties between the entrepreneur and finance experts. 
The items are: “Someone whom I trust to discuss important confidential matters knew at least one 
finance expert”; “A third party whose judgement I trust can bring me in contact with a finance 
expert”; “Through my network of contacts, I could obtain information from a finance expert” 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78).  
 
Control variables. As entrepreneurs with high growth ambitions may have better prepared their 
start-up and hence have acquired a better knowledge of finance alternatives, the expected growth 
rate is included as a control. This is measured as the target number of employees (in full time 
equivalents) and the natural logarithm of target sales as envisioned by the entrepreneur 5 years 
after start-up. The average employment target equals approximately 5 employees, with a 
maximum of 90 employees. In order to further control for preparation, a dummy variable whether 
or not the entrepreneur performed formal financial planning before start-up is included. In 
addition, the percentage of shares retained by the entrepreneurial team is controlled for. If other 
shareholders are involved in the company, then the knowledge base is likely to be broader. In 
order to account for the initial size of the company, the natural logarithm of the level of start-up 
capital is included. Finally, we control for industry effects. The industry dummy variable equals 1 
if a venture operates within ‘wholesale and retail’ or ‘professional, scientific and technical 
activities’ and zero otherwise. Almost 60% of the start-ups are active in wholesale, retail trade and 
professional, scientific and technical activities. The other industries represent less than 10% of the 
sample. The correlations between the independent variables are not sufficiently large so as not to 
cause collinearity problems in multivariate regressions. A correlation matrix is not reported due to 
space limitations, but is available from the authors upon request. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The total knowledge about finance alternatives, the knowledge of common finance alternatives, 
advanced finance alternatives for the start-up phase, advanced finance alternatives for the growth 
phase and bootstrap finance methods are analyzed separately. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests 
(available from the authors upon request) show that entrepreneurs with previous experience in 
accounting or finance have a significantly (p<0.01) higher total knowledge and a higher advanced 
knowledge of finance alternatives for the start-up and the growth phase. They do not have a higher 
knowledge of bootstrap finance techniques. Other types of experience do not lead to higher 
knowledge. Entrepreneurs with either higher education or education in the field of business have a 
significantly (p<0.01) higher total knowledge and higher knowledge of all four factors.  
Entrepreneurs with direct ties to finance experts have a significantly (p<0.05) higher total 
knowledge and a higher knowledge of bootstrap finance and of advanced methods to finance the 
start-up or growth phase, but not of common finance alternatives. Bivariate analyses show no 
significant differences between entrepreneurs with and without indirect ties to financial experts. 
 
  
The multivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables are analyzed 
with Tobit regressions. The Tobit specification was utilized because the dependent variables 
examined were censored. Table 3 presents the results of the multivariate Tobit regressions. Panel 
A reports the models with the total knowledge of finance as dependent variable, Panel B reports 
the models with the knowledge of commonly used finance methods as dependent variable, panel C 
reports the models with the knowledge of advanced start-up finance methods, panel D reports the 
models with the knowledge of advanced growth finance methods and panel E reports the models 
with the knowledge of bootstrap finance as dependent variable. Four models are reported in each 
panel. Model (1) includes the control variables; the human capital variables are included in model 
(2); model (3) expands model (1) with social capital variables and model (4) is the full model, 
including control variables, human capital and social capital variables. While the control variable 
for method of data collection was included in all models, this variable was never significant and is 
not reported for the sake of brevity.  
 
The Mc Fadden’s pseudo R² in all panels shows that adding the independent variables improves 
the fit of the models; the full models have the highest fit. Hence, human and social capital 
variables are important in explaining an entrepreneur’s knowledge of finance alternatives. The 
models explaining the total knowledge of finance alternatives have the highest explanatory power, 
while the models explaining the knowledge of advanced start-up finance alternatives have the 
lowest explanatory power. These are also the alternatives that are the least known by 
entrepreneurs. As the significance and the sign of the coefficients are consistent in the four models 
within a panel, the discussion of the results will focus on the full model (4).  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
The coefficients of the control variables show that entrepreneurs with higher growth aspirations, 
as measured by their targeted number of employees and sales in five years time, have a 
significantly higher knowledge of overall finance alternatives (Panel A), which is mainly driven 
by their higher knowledge of bootstrap finance techniques (Panel E; p<0.01) and of common 
finance techniques (Panel B; p<0.05). Interestingly, entrepreneurs with higher growth aspirations 
do not have a higher knowledge of finance alternatives that are especially important for high 
growth companies, i.e. advanced finance methods for start-ups and for growth companies. A 
higher level of start-up capital is not associated with a higher knowledge of finance alternatives. 
Entrepreneurial teams, retaining higher percentages of the shares of their companies at start-up, 
have a significantly higher knowledge of bootstrap finance techniques (p<0.01). 
 
Adding the human capital variables improves the fit of the models more than adding the social 
capital variables. Education and experience are hence the most important drivers of an 
entrepreneur’s knowledge of finance alternatives. Entrepreneurs with higher education do not have 
a higher knowledge of finance alternatives in general, but they have a higher knowledge of 
advanced finance alternatives for growth companies (p<0.05). Specific business education leads to 
significantly higher knowledge of all finance alternatives (p<0.01). More specifically, business 
education leads to a higher knowledge of commonly used finance alternatives (p<0.01), of 
advanced finance alternatives for growth companies (p<0.01) and of bootstrap finance techniques 
(p<0.05), but not of advanced finance alternatives for start-ups.  
 
Previous experience has a more mixed impact on the knowledge of finance alternatives. 
Experience in accounting or finance has a significant and positive impact on all dependent 
variables. Further, experience in other industries has a positive impact on the total knowledge of 
  
finance alternatives (p<0.05), of commonly used finance alternatives (p<0.01) and on advanced 
finance alternatives for growth companies (p<0.05). Experience in the same industry has a 
significantly positive impact on the knowledge of advanced finance alternatives for growth 
companies (p<0.01). Unexpectedly, entrepreneurs with previous start-up experience have a lower 
knowledge of commonly used finance alternatives (p<0.05). Experience as a self-employed leads 
to a significantly higher knowledge of advanced start-up finance techniques (p<0.05). Overall 
management experience has no impact on an entrepreneur’s knowledge of finance alternatives. 
 
The results are broadly consistent with the predictions of hypotheses 1 and 2. More human 
capital leads to a higher knowledge of finance alternatives, but the impact of human capital 
depends on its specificity. More specific human capital, i.e. a business education or experience in 
accounting or finance, has a stronger positive impact on financial knowledge than more generic 
human capital. Generic human capital cannot be ignored, however, as higher (non-business) 
education and industry experience, either in the same or in another industry, are positively 
associated with the knowledge of some forms of finance.  
 
The effect of entrepreneurs’ social capital is weaker than the effect of their human capital. An 
entrepreneur having direct ties with finance experts has no effect on the entrepreneur’s knowledge 
of finance alternatives at start-up, except for the commonly used finance alternatives (p<0.05). 
Indirect ties with finance experts enhance an entrepreneur’s total knowledge of finance 
alternatives (p<0.05), but they have no statistically significant impact on the knowledge of specific 
finance techniques. The support for hypotheses 3 and 4 is hence weak. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
While it is widely acknowledged that financial resource acquisition is a key process in the start-
up and growth of new businesses, our understanding of this process is largely rooted in economic 
theories emphasizing wealth maximization as an overarching goal, rational behavior of all actors 
involved and information asymmetries. Theories building on the existence of information 
asymmetries typically assume that (potential) investors are informationally constrained, which 
influences their selection and post-investment processes: investors select the ventures in which 
they invest. This paper highlights a second information asymmetry problem, namely the fact that 
entrepreneurs do not have full information of finance alternatives. This knowledge gap leads 
entrepreneurs to select these finance alternatives they are familiar with, potentially leading to 
suboptimal finance structures. 
 
The main contribution of this paper lies in the finding that entrepreneurs with higher levels of 
specific human and social capital have lower knowledge gaps. Especially specific human capital, 
i.e. a business education or previous experience in accounting or finance, increases an 
entrepreneur’s knowledge of finance alternatives. Generic human capital in the form of higher 
education or general experience has a more modest, but also positive impact. The impact of an 
entrepreneur’s social capital at start-up is more limited, albeit positive. Overall, we contribute to a 
further socializing of the finance acquisition process in entrepreneurial ventures, by demonstrating 
the key role of entrepreneurial characteristics on finance decisions in start-ups.  
 
We have shown that entrepreneurs’ knowledge of finance alternatives in general is rather 
limited. Even the knowledge of commonly used finance methods and of widely applicable 
bootstrap finance methods is limited. More complex finance options, specifically targeted towards 
growth oriented ventures, are even less understood. The knowledge of finance methods targeted at 
start-ups is the least understood category. Moreover, the lack of knowledge on specific 
  
government measures for start-ups is worrying, as these are specifically targeted towards the 
entrepreneurs represented in the sample. These findings are broadly consistent with Van Auken 
(2001) for US entrepreneurs. 
 
A methodological strength of this study is the fact that all social and human capital variables are 
measured at start-up, hence eliminating survival and recall biases. It would be interesting to add a 
longitudinal dimension to the current research. This would allow understanding how the initial 
knowledge gap influences subsequent finance and growth processes. Is the knowledge gap of an 
entrepreneur at start-up a major hindrance in the development of the start-up, or is the entrepreneur 
able to overcome this liability through subsequent learning and experience? These are important 
avenues for future research. 
 
The study suggests implications for policy makers and for entrepreneurs. The role of business 
education is highlighted. Strengthening life-long education for entrepreneurs on business in 
general and on financial matters in particular is warranted. Further, when new policy initiatives are 
developed, frequent and clear communication with the target group and their advisors is key. This 
study suggests that well-designed initiatives often fail to capture the attention of their target group.  
 
Entrepreneurs should understand that finance is a key resource for their business; failure to 
understand the finance alternatives and their characteristics may seriously hamper the 
development of their ventures. Most entrepreneurs, however, have a limited knowledge of finance 
options, even if they have a broad business experience. They may enhance their understanding 
thereof through training. Further, they should understand that links to financial experts are 
valuable in reducing the knowledge gap. If they do not have direct links yet, they should actively 
seek to establish them. If they have links to experts, they should activate them and tap their 
knowledge. 
 
CONTACT: Arnout Seghers; Arnout.Seghers@UGent.be; (T): +3292643507; (F): +3292643577; 
Department of Accounting and Corporate Finance, Ghent University, Kuiperskaai 55E, 9000 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Abbreviation N Min Max Mean Std.Dev. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES         
Total knowledge about finance alternatives Total 125 -1.37 0.68 -0.47 0.40 
Knowledge of common finance alternatives Common 125 -1.42 1.00 -0.10 0.52 
Knowledge of advanced finance alternatives for the 
start-up phase Start-up  125 -1.50 1.00 -1.21 0.40 
Knowledge of advanced finance alternatives for the 
growth phase  Growth 125 -1.50 0.70 -0.67 0.57 
Knowledge of bootstrap finance methods Bootstrap 125 -1.00 1.00 -0.07 0.41 
CONTROL VARIABLES        
Targeted number of employees after 5 years  N°Empl 112 0 90 4.96 12.62 
Ln (targeted sales after 5 years)  Sales 93 5.53 17.62 12.91 2.07 
Financial planning (dummy) FinPlan 124 0 1 0.93  
Percentage of shares retained by the entrepreneurial 
team Share% 121 0 100 94.97 17.65 
Ln (level of start-up capital)  StartCap 110 0.00 17.13 9.86 2.99 
Method of data collection (dummy) DataColl 125 0 1 0.84  
Industry (dummy) Industry 121 0 1 0.60  
         
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES         
HUMAN CAPITAL         
Higher education (dummy) HighEdu 121 0 1 0.72  
Business education (dummy) BusiEdu 121 0 1 0.37  
Number of years of work experience gained by 
founders in the same industry ExpSameInd 121 0 40 8.88 7.81 
Number of years of work experience gained by 
founders in other industries ExpOtherInd 121 0 20 6.46 6.74 
Number of years of work experience gained by 
founders in the domain of accountancy or finance ExpAcc&Finn 121 0 40 1.36 4.90 
Founder with a prior management position in a 
large or medium company (i.e., number of employees 
greater than 100) (dummy) MgtExp 121 0 1 0.21  
Founder with a previous self-employment experience 
(dummy) ExpSelf-Empl  121 0 1 0.37  
Founder with previous start up experience (dummy) ExpStart-up  121 0 1 0.31  
SOCIAL CAPITAL        
Direct ties  DirTies 120 -1 1 0.37 0.46 
Indirect ties  IndirTies 121 -1 1 0.26 0.53 
 
  
Table 2: Rotated Orthogonal Factor Analysis for Knowledge of Finance Alternatives  
 Factor 
 Knowledge of finance alternatives  Common Start-up Growth Bootstrap 
Loans 0.874 0.153 0.206 0.028 
Credit lines  0.811 0.162 0.196 0.106 
Supplier’s credit 0.693 0.337 0.369 0.166 
Leasing 0.690 0.351 0.107 0.104 
Customer’s credit 0.597 0.341 0.447 0.180 
Friends and Family financing 0.592 0.254 0.289 0.072 
Public Stock  0.176 0.859 0.215 0.076 
Private stock 0.194 0.81 0.223 0.116 
Bonds 0.294 0.753 0.058 0.143 
Factoring 0.388 0.598 0.286 0.208 
Venture capital 0.432 0.586 0.185 0.411 
Joint utilization 0.070 0.189 0.808 0.004 
Minimization accounts receivable 0.358 0.125 0.778 0.092 
Minimization capital invested in inventory 0.339 0.18 0.755 0.089 
Delaying payments 0.516 0.242 0.630 0.154 
IWT-subsidy 0.169 -0.020 -0.009 0.805 
Vinnof -0.079 0.157 0.128 0.803 
ARKimedes 0.124 0.212 0.028 0.789 
Business Angels 0.311 0.441 0.232 0.515 
     
Eigenvalue: 8.813 2.060 1.331 1.153 
Percent variance explained  46.385 57.227 64.234 70.303 
 
 
Table 3: Multivariate Tobit Regression Models 
Constant -2.490 *** -2.483 *** -2.219 *** -2.199 *** -2.266 ** -2.339 *** -1.671 * -1.706 ** -3.278 ** -3.054 ** -2.811 * -2.687 * -2.346 ** -2.533 *** -2.380 ** -2.264 ** -2.790 *** -2.799 *** -2.554 *** -2.566 ***
Control variables
N°Empl 0.008 * 0.008 * 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.010 † 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.009 * 0.010 ** 0.009 * 0.009 **
Sales 0.048 * 0.044 * 0.048 * 0.044 * 0.076 ** 0.075 ** 0.061 * 0.058 * 0.041 0.031 0.033 0.019 0.051 0.040 0.069 † 0.049 † 0.073 ** 0.069 ** 0.071 ** 0.069 **
FinPlan 0.146 0.146 0.262 † 0.269 * 0.110 0.064 0.121 0.103 -0.091 0.044 -0.102 -0.023 0.162 0.117 0.476 * 0.375 † 0.171 0.165 0.253 0.273 †
Share% 0.010 * 0.010 ** 0.007 † 0.007 † 0.007 0.008 † 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.015 ** 0.016 *** 0.013 ** 0.013 **
StartCap 0.012 -0.001 0.005 -0.011 0.043 * 0.023 0.037 † 0.015 -0.003 -0.035 -0.006 -0.032 0.012 -0.009 -0.001 -0.027 0.012 0.001 0.006 -0.008
Industry 0.096 0.050 0.032 -0.037 0.025 -0.067 -0.031 -0.171 † 0.130 0.053 0.105 0.037 0.080 -0.033 -0.024 -0.163 0.020 -0.025 -0.027 -0.094
Dependent variables 
Human Capital 
HighEdu 0.070 0.058 0.036 0.059 0.281 0.299 0.282 * 0.258 * 0.013 0.008
BusiEdu 0.187 * 0.199 ** 0.268 * 0.304 ** 0.236 0.222 0.479 *** 0.507 ** 0.153 † 0.176 *
ExpSameInd 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.023 ** 0.025 ** -0.004 -0.002
ExpOtherInd 0.006 0.010 * 0.015 * 0.018 ** 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.018 * 0.007 0.011 †
ExpAcc&Finn 0.015 * 0.015 * 0.032 ** 0.036 ** 0.025 † 0.024 † 0.028 ** 0.030 ** 0.013 † 0.013 †
MgtExp 0.018 0.000 -0.031 -0.021 0.017 0.063 0.043 -0.033 0.072 0.042
ExpSelf-Empl 0.148 0.115 0.079 0.023 0.553 * 0.505 * 0.080 0.041 0.176 0.149
ExpStart-up -0.152 -0.187 † -0.257 † -0.269 * -0.339 -0.286 -0.067 -0.154 -0.191 -0.226 †
Social Capital 0.112
DirTies -0.014 0.057 0.157 0.293 * -0.074 0.017 -0.193 0.105 0.073 0.112
IndirTies 0.233 * 0.203 * 0.159 0.134 0.271 0.171 0.387 * 0.219 0.104 0.098
Mc Fadden's Pseudo- R² 0.328 0.583 0.470 0.787 0.178 0.370 0.230 0.487 0.040 0.131 0.056 0.145 0.071 0.312 0.130 0.393 0.312 0.442 0.346 0.502
Model 3Model 2Model 1 Model 1 Model 4Model 3Model 2Model 1Model 4 Model 3Model 2Model 1Model 4Model 3Model 2
BootstrapTotal Common GrowthStart-up 
Model 1 Model 4Model 3Model 2 Model 4
 
Significance levels: ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05; †<0.1 
